- Why in News- Saudi Arabia, which had adopted an aggressive foreign policy in recent years seeking to expand its influence in West Asia and roll back that of Iran, its bitter rival, is now following a dramatic course correction.
- It’s reaching out to old rivals, holding talks with new enemies and seeking to balance between great powers, all while trying to transform its economy at home.
- If the Saudi drive to autonomise its foreign policy and build regional stability through diplomacy holds, it can have serious implications for West Asia.
- How is Saudi foreign policy changing?
- For years, the main driver of Saudi foreign policy was the kingdom’s hostility towards Iran.
- This has resulted in proxy conflicts across the region.
- For example, in Syria, Iran’s only state ally in West Asia, Saudi Arabia joined hands with its Gulf allies as well as Turkey and the West to bankroll and arm the rebellion against President Bashar al Assad.
- In Yemen, whose capital Sana’a was captured by the Iran-backed Shia Houthi rebels in 2014, the Saudis started a bombing campaign in March 2015, which hasn’t formally come to an end yet.
- One of the demands the Saudis made to Qatar when it imposed a blockade on its smaller neighbour in 2017 was to sever ties with Iran.
- However, the Qatar blockade came to an unsuccessful end in 2021.
- Last month, Saudi Arabia announced a deal, after China-mediated talks, to normalise diplomatic ties with Iran.
- Earlier this week, a SaudiOmani delegation travelled to Yemen to hold talks with the Houthi rebels for a permanent ceasefire. All these moves mark a decisive shift from the policy adopted by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman after he rose to the top echelons of the Kingdom in 2017.
- Aggressiveness makes way for diplomacy and loyal alliances make room for pragmatic realignments.
- This is happening at a time when Saudi Arabia is also trying to balance between the U.S., its largest arms supplier, Russia, its OPEC-Plus partner, and China, the new superpower in the region.
- A host of factors seem to have influenced this shift. The Kingdom’s recent regional bets were either unsuccessful or only partially successful.
- In Syria, Mr. Assad, backed by Russia and Iran, has won the civil war.
- In Yemen, while the Saudi intervention may have helped prevent the Houthis from expanding their reach beyond Sana’a and the north, the Saudi-led coalition, failed to oust them from the capital.
- In parallel, the U.S.’s priority is shifting away from West Asia.
- When China, which has good ties with both Tehran and Riyadh, offered to mediate between the two, the Saudis found it as an opportunity and seized it.
- The U.S., which has thousands of troops and military assets in the Gulf, including its Fifth Fleet, would continue to play a major security role in the region. For Saudi Arabia, the U.S. remains its largest defence supplier.
- But at the same time, the Saudis realise that the U.S.’s deprioritisation of West Asia is altering the postWar order of the region.
- What Saudi Arabia is trying to do is to use the vacuum created by the U.S. policy changes to autonomise its foreign policy.
- What are the implications for the region?
- Saudi Arabia’s normalisation talks with Syria or its talks with the Houthis cannot be seen separately from the bigger picture of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement.
- While the Saudis are trying to build crossGulf stability, another part of West Asia remains tumultuous — which was evident in the Israeli raid at Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa, Islam’s third holiest place of worship.
- Another challenge before Saudi Arabia is to retain the course of autonomy without irking the U.S. beyond a point.
- In postWar West Asia, the U.S. had been part of almost all major realignments — either through force or talks, from the Suez war to the Abraham Accords.
- But now, when China and Russia are mediating talks between rivals successfully and Saudi Arabia, a trusted ally, is busy building its own autonomy, the U.S., despite its huge military presence in the region, is reduced to being a spectator.
